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INTRODUCTION
The briefs filed by appellees A.H. Palmer & Sons ("Palmer")
and Interwest Construction ("Interwest") bring to mind an old
trial lawyer's adage: If you can't dazzle the court, you can at
least baffle it. Both briefs are founded upon evident
misconstructions of controlling law and plain distortions of the
record.

Indeed, the level of legal and factual confusion generated

is so high that an orderly (and comprehensible) reply is difficult.
Thiokol Corporation, however, will attempt to penetrate the fog.
Palmer and Interwest variously assert: (1) that Thiokol has
not "marshalled" the evidence (Palmer Brief 20-23; Interwest Brief
2

.

.

.

6 ), (2) that the trial court either did not use —
properly invoked —

or quite

negligence principles to absolve them of

contractual liability (Pal. Br. 7-8, 23-29; Int. Br. 6-8), (3) that
Thiokol has waived (or modified) its contractual rights (Pal. Br.
34-39, Int. Br. 8-13), (4) that Thiokol's deficient plans and
supervision absolve them of contractual liability (Pal. Br. 40-44),
(5) that Thiokol's tort theories are inappropriate (Pal. Br. 29-34,
Int. Br. 15-19), and (6) that implied warranty and strict liability
theories do not apply to the case (Pal. Br. 44-47, Int. Br. 13-15).
Thiokol will respond to these contentions, although not in the
order presented by appellees.
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures Company and
Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc., ("Rysgaard," or "the tank
manufacturer") has not filed a brief or otherwise refuted any of
the arguments made in Thiokol's Opening Brief (hereinafter
"Thiokol Br.").
2

Hereinafter cited as "Pal. Br." and "Int. Br."
1

Despite Palmer's and Interwest's histrionics about
"marshalling the evidence," this is not a case that turns upon how
the Court construes the record.

Thiokol's opening brief carefully

(and as dispassionately as possible) presented all of the arguments
(and evidence) presented by Palmer and Interwest in support of
their claims.

See Thiokol Br. 2-13, 15-19.

Indeed, any additional

"evidence" cited by appellees in their briefs either does not add
to Thiokol's summary of the evidence or (even worse) distorts the
record.

Thiokol, moreover, has not asked this Court to discard
4

the trial court's factual findings.

This case, in short,

presents legal issues regarding contract construction, not factual
disputes.

Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

Because the appellees' "factual" contentions haye been raised
in a studied attempt to deflect attention from clear legal error,
Thiokol will respond to factual arguments last and concentrate,
initially, on the questions of law presented.

Contrary to

appellees' submissions, the trial court did apply negligence
principles to this contract case, a result that is simply
unsupported by any authority.

Thiokol, furthermore, did not waive

or modify its contractual rights. Thiokol's tort, warranty, and
Virtually all of the "Factual support for Findings of
the Court" presented on pages 8-20 of Palmer's brief is
summarized on pages 2-13 and 15-19 of Thiokol's opening brief.
Indeed, as discussed in Section VI below, the only real
"additions" contained in Palmer's brief are outright factual
distortions. See, e.g., Pal. Br. 19 (asserting that Thiokol's
expert "stated that the failure was not inconsistent with upward
pressure") (citing Tr. 357-58). The transcript, however, reveals
that the expert testimony was precisely to the contrary. See
infra Addendum J[ 3.
4

See Thiokol Br. 29-30 & n.24.
2

strict liability theories, moreover, are well-founded and were
improperly disregarded by the trial court.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOCATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN
A BREACH OF CONTRACT CASE IS UNSOUND AND UNPRECEDENTED

Palmer and Interwest argue that the trial court either did not
use negligence principles (Pal. Br. 7-8) or, alternatively, that
"contract defense principles similar to tort defenses" were
properly invoked.
unfounded.

Id. at 23; Int. Br. 6-8.

These contentions are

Even cursory perusal of the Memorandum Decision (App. A

to Thiokol!s Brief) and the appellees1 briefs demonstrates that
"[t]his . . . contract case" (Pal. Br. 2) was decided on
comparative negligence grounds —

a result totally unsupported in

theory or precedent.
The trial court's supposed "contract" analysis proceeded along
the following lines: (1) the standards of NBS PS15-69 and the
industry-wide safety factor of 10 were not incorporated into the
contract (App. A at 2, 6), (2) Thiokol did not show the "cause" of
the tank failure (App. A at 2, 4-5), and (3) the ultimate rupture
of T33 was Thiokol1s responsibility because the company "should
have been aware of" the tank's defects (App. A at 6).

While the

first step in this reasoning does turn on contract principles, the
trial court plainly misapplied the controlling law.
27-28.

Thiokol Br.

The second and third steps of the court's analysis,

A document is incorporated into a contract so long as
the reference is clear and called to the attention of the
contracting parties. Thiokol Br. 17 (citing extensive
authority). Val Palmer (Tr. 1787) and the tank manufacturer (Tr.
1923, 1975) admitted that Thiokol's contract referenced NBS PS1569. Indeed, they expressly reassured Thiokol that the
"Structural Layer" of the tanks would be fabricated "as per NBS
3

however, are grounded —
"Causation" —

not in contract —

but in tort.

the second step in the trial court's

"contractual" inquiry —
of contract, action.

is an element of a negligence, not breach

See Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726

(Utah 1985) (listing the elements of a negligence action as duty,
breach, "causation of injury," and damages).

A contract action, by

contrast, is complete upon showing of a contract, breach and
damages.

E.g., John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 117

at 673 (1990) ("Any breach of contract, total or partial, provides
the aggrieved party with a right to bring an action for
damages").

The existence of a contract here is undisputed, and

the appellees have conceded "that there was a breach of the
PS 15.69." App. J. fl 3 (emphasis added). Industry standards,
moreover, are incorporated into a contract "[ujnless otherwise
agreed." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222(3); Rex T.
Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell, 445 P.2d 136 (Utah 1968). Every
expert who testified at trial — including those hired by Palmer
and Interwest — agreed that a 10-to-l safety factor is an
industry standard. Tr. 1602, 1890 (testimony by Palmer experts).
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that NBS PS 15-69 and a
safety factor of 10 were not "incorporated with sufficient
clarity for the designer to be aware of their application" (App.
A at 6) is erroneous as a matter of law.
Even if "causation" were somehow relevant to breach of
contract, the lower court's legal conclusion that Thiokol had not
established that element is erroneous. The undisputed testimony
was that, if the tanks had been built to a safety factor of three
(let alone the factor of ten required by industry standards), the
"overfilling" found by the trial court would not have resulted in
the rupture of tank T33. See Thiokol Br. 31-32 (citing Tr. 213234); cf. Pal. Br. 13 (misconstruing the testimony at Tr. 213233). Palmer asserts that Thiokol's expert, on those pages,
"could not account for the failure." Pal. Br. 13. In fact, the
testimony cited by Palmer is that, if (as Palmer asserts) the
tanks had been built to a safety factor of three, overfilling
could not have caused the rupture because overfilling would only
take "100th of the safety factor." Tr. 2133 (emphasis added).
The tanks, in short, did not even have a safety factor of three.
See infra Addendum f 2.
4

contract, a technical breach, by virtue of the fact that defective
tanks were supplied."

Tr. 2321 (Interwest's closing argument);

accord App. A at 6 (Memorandum Decision) (the "tanks were underdesigned," and "did not have sufficient hoop or tensile strength
and likely may have eventually failed in any regard").
Because the contract and its breach were conceded by appellees
and acknowledged by the trial court, why did the court refuse to
award damages?

Because the court relied upon negligence principles

in step three of its analysis to absolve the appellees: Thiokol
"should have been aware of the need for higher standards as applied
to both wall thickness, woven roving overlapping and safety
factors."

App. A at 6.

Thus, even though Thiokol1s contractors

supplied tanks with insufficient wall thickness, substandard
overlapping of woven roving, and an "almost immaterial" safety
factor (Tr. 602), Thiokol was negligent in not detecting such
derelictions and, therefore, must bear any losses resulting from
the failure of T3 3.
That comparative fault is the basis for the trial court's
"contractual" decision is also demonstrated by opposing counsels'
closing arguments at trial (Tr. 2322)7 and their appellate briefs.
Interwest's brief (at 7) forthrightly asserts that "Thiokol's
relative knowledge, expertise, and opportunities to prevent the
damages at issue in this litigation give rise to significant
comparative fault issues." Palmer, for its part, while never

Tr. 2322 (Interwest's counsel argues that Thiokol
should be precluded "to the extent that we can prove they were
actionably negligent").
5

conceding that comparative negligence lies at the root of the trial
o

court's decision, nevertheless expends significant effort arguing
Thiokol's fault.

E.g.. Pal. Br. 11-12, 15-20, 40-44.

But, notwithstanding opposing counsels' novel (and at times
incomprehensible, e.g., Pal. Br. 23-26) arguments, the trial
court's application of comparative fault to a contract case is
theoretically unsound and absolutely unprecedented.

It is

theoretically unsound because it denies Thiokol the right to secure
"legally enforceable promises" (Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 344 cmt. a) any time Thiokol's "relative knowledge [or]
expertise" (Int. Br. 7) is greater than that of the promisor.
Thiokol Br. 24-26.

Appellees have been excused from breach

because, notwithstanding their shoddy performance, Thiokol should
9

have prevented or halted their defaults. No court — to
Thiokol's knowledge — has ever seriously entertained such reasoning.
Cf. Pal. Br. 7-8 (asserting that the trial court did
not rely upon negligence principles).
See Pal. Br. 42-44 (arguing that, "because Thiokol
created the plans and specifications and closely supervised all
work, especially the fix, the parties are absolved of
responsibility"). According to Interwest, Thiokol may not
recover because it "was more involved in the manufacture of the
product at issue here than any of the parties it is seeking to
recover from." Int. Br. 17 (emphasis deleted). Poor, unhappy
Thiokol! If Palmer and Interwest are right, it may not "draft a
reasonable contract and thereafter assume performance . . . in
the ordinary course." Thiokol Br. 25.
10

E.g., Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1096
(Wyo. 1993) ("because [the attorney/client relationship] is
contractual in nature and is to be treated according to the law
of contracts, there is no justification to invoke the comparative
negligence statute"); Rediske v. Minnesota Valley Breeder's
Ass'n, 374 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to
apply Minnesota comparative fault statute to contract action);
Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th
6

Nor have counsel for Palmer or Interwest cited any authority
for application of comparative negligence principles to contractual
breach.

On the contrary, Interwest (perhaps inadvertently?) has

cited authority fatal to the appellees' position.

As support for

the proposition that comparative negligence principles are
applicable, Interwest cites H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 14.17 (2d
ed. 1987).

That treatise, however, explains that "•[contributory

negligence has never been an available defense in cases involving
express warranties1" because "express warranty is clearly a
contract action to which negligence has no relationship."

Id.

(emphasis added).
The remaining "authority" cited by appellees similarly
undercuts their position.

Palmer and Interwest both cite Jacobsen

Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering Co., 619 P.2d 306
(Utah 1980) , for the proposition that "tort defenses, such as the
former assumption of risk [a comparative fault principle ], apply
in contract."

Pal. Br. 23; Int. Br. 7-8.

Jacobsen, however, did

Cir. 1984) ("contributory negligence has no place in contract and
fraud actions"); Haysville U.S.D. No. 261 v. GAF Corp., 666 P.2d
192, 199 (Kan. 1983) ("The use of comparative negligence theory
is not proper in breach of contract actions"); Broce-O'Dell
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Mel Jarvis Constr. Co., 634 P.2d 1142,
1145 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) ("It is well settled that contributory
negligence is no defense to a breach of contract"); Rotman v.
Hirsch, 199 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1972) ("contributory negligence
would not be available as a defense to an action on contract");
Fresno Air Serv. v. Wood, 43 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965) ("Assumption of risk and contributory negligence appear to
fall within the general field of trespass and negligence . . .
and hence are not applicable as theories of law and defenses to
actions . . . for breach of contract"); see also Lee v. Andrews,
667 P.2d 919, 921 (Mont. 1983) (finding use of "comparative
negligence principles" in a contract case erroneous).
11

Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720, 726 (Utah
1981) ("assumption of the risk" is merely one aspect of
comparative negligence) (Pal. Br. 25-26).

not hold that assumption of the risk (or other comparative fault
principles) are applicable to contract actions.
opposite: it unequivocally rejected that notion.

Quite the
As the court

explained:
For purposes of analysis, assumption of risk is often
divided into three categories. Those courts which
attempt to deal with the various concepts subsumed under
the one label refrain from considering one form, that is,
the "express" form of assumption of risk. . . . An
express assumption of risk involves a contractual
provision in which a party expressly contracts not to sue
for injury or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by
the acts of another. We not only follow suit by
refraining to include this form of assumption of risk in
our discussion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity
for including this form within assumption of risk
terminology. As stated in James, Assumption of Risk, 61
Yale L.J. 141 (1952), the field of contract law is more
than adequate to deal with this bar to recovery.
619 P.2d at 310 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Thus,

Jacobsen actually stands for the proposition that contractual
undertakings are unrelated to tort, and that it is unnecessary

—

12

and unwise —

to import "tort" into "contract."

Vernon v. Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 302 (Utah 1971), furthermore,
does not support Palmer's assertion that contributory negligence is
a defense "in contract."

Pal. Br. 25. Vernon merely holds that

assumption of the risk, in limited circumstances, is a valid
defense in certain warranty cases.

488 P.2d at 304-05

Because the Jacobsen court expressly excluded contracts
from comparative fault analysis, Palmer's citation of Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869-70 (Utah 1981),
is unavailing. Moore is cited (Pal. Br. 24) for the proposition
that assumption of risk may "involve[] an express agreement by
the plaintiff to accept the risk of danger." 631 P.2d at 869-70.
This contractual "assumption of the risk," of course, is
precisely the concept excluded from tort theory by Jacobsen, 619
P.2d at 310 (the "field of contract law is more than adequate to
deal with this bar to recovery").
8

("deliberately and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
risk" may reduce warranty recovery); see also H. Woods, Comparative
Fault § 14.17 (2d ed. 1987).

A "warranty" action, however, is not

a "contract" action. As explained in Thiokol's opening brief (at
26-27 & n.17), warranty had its inception in and retains the
characteristics of a tort action. Contributory negligence,
therefore, remains "a good [warranty] defense." Nelson v.
Anderson, 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Minn. 1955).13
The trial court, despite Palmer's current protestations (Pal.
Br. 7-8), quite clearly accepted the appellees' invitation to
release them from contractual liability "to the extent that we can
prove [Thiokol was] actionably negligent."

Tr. 2322.

This result

completely undoes the theoretical underpinnings of contract law
(i.e.. the enforcement of mutually bargained promises, see supra
note 10) and is absolutely unsupported by precedent.

The decision

of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded for
14

calculation of Thiokol's damages.
Thiokol's warranty claims are not barred because the
company did not "know of the defect and the danger, but
nevertheless 'deliberately and unreasonably' go[] ahead."
Vernon. 488 P.2d at 305; see Thiokol Br. 38-39. On the contrary,
Thiokol had been consistently assured that the repaired tanks
were safe. E.g., Thiokol Br. 9-10; App. O f 2 (express warranty
guaranteeing the "structural integrity of [the repaired] tanks
for a period of three years against structural failure").
14

Palmer's citation (Pal. Br. 26) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 344 to support "comparative fault"
contracts verges on the ludicrous. That section provides that
Thiokol is entitled to either its "expectation interest" (i.e.,
the benefit of its bargain), or its "reliance interest" (i.e.,
the costs it incurred relying on the contract). Thiokol has been
denied recovery of either interest. Thiokol did not (as Palmer
cynically asserts) "expect" — much less "rely upon" — the
appellees' delivery of "an inferior product which [would] someday
9

II.

THIOKOL DID NOT WAIVE OR MODIFY ITS CONTRACT RIGHTS

Interwoven throughout the trial court's decision and the
appellees' briefs are assertions that Thiokol either "waived" (App.
A at 6; Pal. Br. 26-29; Int. Br. 8-13) or "modified" (App. A at 7;
Pal. Br. 34-39) its contract rights by accepting the repair of the
tanks.

Although Palmer (Pal. Br. 35) and Interwest (Int. Br. 9)

both concede that —

at the time of the first tank failure

—

Thiokol could have declared breach and required replacement of the
tanks, they nevertheless assert that Thiokol "waived" or "modified"
its rights by accepting, instead, the appellees' proffered repair.
These arguments are insupportable.
Thiokol (with one exception) does not dispute the law of
"waiver" and "modification" cited by appellees.

The Utah Supreme

Court "has consistently defined waiver as 'the intentional
relinquishment of a known right.'"

Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quoting Rees
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah
1991)).15

Parties to a contract, moreover, "may, by mutual

consent, modify any or all" of their contractual obligations.

Ted

R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).

fail."

To establish a modification,

Pal. Br. 26.

15

Accord Anderson v. Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) ("Waiver is defined as the voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known right"); Epperson v.
Roloff, 719 P.2d 799, 804 (Nev. 1986) (defining waiver as "an
intentional relinquishment of a known right") (quoting J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-34, at 446 (2d
ed. 1977)); Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Ref. & Mkta.. Inc.,
764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
10

"[h]owever, the minds of the parties must have met." Provo City
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979).
evidence showing this meeting of the minds —

And,

contrary to Palmer's

unsupported fiat (at 39) — must be "clear and convincing, and of
the most positive character."
(1963).16

17A C.J.S. Contracts § 588

Furthermore, the contract here expressly provides that

"this contract may not be altered, amended or modified except in
writing, signed by duly authorized representatives of both
parties."

App. D to Thiokol's Opening Brief at f 4.
17

The appellees1 arguments (adopted by the trial court)

fall

decidedly short of establishing either "waiver" or "modification."
There is no "clear and convincing" evidence (see supra note 16),
nor is there any "writing, signed by duly authorized
representatives," supporting either theory.

App. D, f 4.

Indeed,

Interwest candidly concedes that "there is no evidence that Thiokol
expressly relinquished its rights as against Interwest either at
[the time of the repair of the tanks] or [at] any other time."
Int. Br. 11. Palmer and Interwest, however, assert that an intent
to waive or modify can be "inferred" from Thiokol's actions. Id.
Accord Mathis v. Thunderbird Village, Inc., 389 P.2d
343, 349 (Or. 1964) (although parties, by subsequent actions, may
modify contract, "[l]ike other nonwritten contractual
modifications, the evidence of the modification must be clear and
convincing"); Grizzly Bar, Inc. v. Hartman, 454 P.2d 788, 791
(Colo. 1969) ("Modification of a written agreement must be
demonstrated by clear and satisfactory evidence. . . . It cannot
be effected by the sole action of one of the parties. Consent of
both is necessary. The same meeting of minds is needed as was
necessary to make the contract in the first instance.").
App. A at 7 (finding "waiver" and/or "modification" for
the reasons "argued by Palmer").
11

The trial court (based upon Palmer's arguments, App. A at 7)
"inferred" waiver and/or modification from the following:
(1) Thiokol "opted to approve the fix and accept the tanks" (Pal.
Br. 35-36; App. A at 7); (2) Thiokol used its "independent expert
Dr. Thomas to verify the fix" (Pal. Br. 35; App. A at 7 ) ;
(3) Thiokol negotiated with the tank manufacturer regarding the
"fix," leaving "Interwest and Palmer out of the loop" (Pal. Br. 35;
App. A at 3, 7 ) ; and (4) Thiokol sought an extended warranty
directly from the manufacturer (Pal. Br. 36; App. A at 3).
Int. Br. 10-13.
law —

These actions, however, do not —

Accord

as a matter of

amount to "waiver" or "modification" of the original

contract.
To begin with, even granting that Thiokol independently sought
to verify the soundness of the "fix," directly negotiated with the
tank manufacturer, sought an extended warranty covering the "fix,"
and left Palmer and Interwest "out of the loop" (a position at odds
18

with uncontradicted record evidence),

these actions simply do

not "waive" or "modify" Thiokol's rights.

Indeed, Palmer and

Interwest, concede that "the tanks were to be within specifications
after the fix" (Pal. Br. 36, citing Finding of Fact 23).

The

"fix," in short, according to the express assurances made to
Thiokol (e.g., Exh. 13), would not "waive" or "modify" the contract
but, on the contrary, was intended to bring the tanks into
18

Palmer's and Interwest's "out of the loop" arguments
ignore uncontradicted evidence that they urged Thiokol to accept
the repair. See Tr. 1551, 1556 (testimony by Palmer's foreman
regarding the "prodding" it took to get Thiokol to accept the
"fix," and Palmer's "delight" when the "fix" was accepted). See
also Thiokol Br. 43-44 & App. P.
12

conformity with the terms of the original contract.
Thus, Thiokol's attempts to verify the soundness of the
"fix" —

as well as its discussions with the tank manufacturer and

its procurement of an express warranty covering the repaired tanks
— plainly do not show that Thiokol "has intentionally relinquished
a known right, either expressly or by conduct inconsistent with an
intent to enforce that right." Lone Mountain Production Co. v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 710 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D. Utah 1989)
(discussing the Utah law of waiver), aff'd. 984 F.2d 1551 (10th
Cir. 1992).

Nor do such actions demonstrate that "the minds of the

parties . . . have met upon an asserted contract modification."
Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah
1979).

On the contrary, Thiokol's actions demonstrate its

continuing efforts to insure that —
contract —

as required by the original

the "structural laminate sequence" of the tanks would

be built according to "the 'applicable1 sections of . . . NBS-PS15-69."

Exh. 13 at 2 (tank manufacturer's final written

communication, reassuring Thiokol regarding the soundness of the
20

proposed "fix").
Because Thiokol's actions in negotiating the "fix" do not
evidence any intent to depart from the terms of the original
E.g., Exh. 13 (tank manufacturer's written assurance
that the repair would brings the tanks into conformity with "the
•applicable1 sections of . . . NBS-PS-15-19") (emphasis added).
20

And, although Palmer quibbles with Thiokol's original
contract terms (Pal. Br. 40-42), it cannot escape the fact that
its own expert witnesses testified that, given identical
specifications, they could have "designed perfectly serviceable
tanks" (Tr. 1898) that would not have failed. Tr. 1647.
13

contract, the present "waiver" and "modification" arguments
necessarily boil down to the simple assertion that Thiokol lost its
rights because it "opted to approve the fix and accept the tanks."
Pal. Br. 35-36; accord App. A at 7.
encourage —

not penalize —

The law, however, must

parties who attempt to resolve
21

contractual disputes by private agreement.

If the trial court

and appellees are correct, Utah law demands immediate litigation
rather than conciliatory negotiation.

Cf. Int. Br. 9 (chastising

Thiokol for negotiating a "fix" rather than exercising its
"existing right" of immediate suit); Pal. Br. 35-36 (same).
The result reached below is contrary to sound policy.

Indeed,

the very authority appellees cite demonstrates the absurdity of
their "waiver" and "modification" arguments.

In Vessels Oil & Gas

Co. v. Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc., 764 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) (cited at Int. Br. 9), Vessels brought a breach of
contract action in Colorado against Coastal. Although the contract
contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation in Texas,
Coastal did not invoke the clause and, instead, conducted
settlement negotiations.

After settlement talks failed, however,

Coastal invoked the forum selection clause. Vessels —
appellees here —

like the

argued that, by engaging in settlement

discussions, Coastal had "waived" the Texas forum.
The Colorado Court of Appeals resoundingly rejected the waiver
argument.

After noting that "waiver is the intentional

relinquishment of a known right," the Colorado court concluded that
Thiokol Br. 42.
14

two months of settlement negotiations did not result in waiver
precisely because "good faith settlement negotiations" are "a
practice to be encouraged, not penalized."

764 P.2d at 392.

Likewise, the amicable resolution of contractual disputes —
cure of defective performances —

by the

is "a practice to be encouraged,

22

not penalized."
III. THIOKOL'S NON-CONTRACTUAL THEORIES WERE IMPROPERLY
DISREGARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT
Appellees assert that they are not liable in tort (Pal. Br.
29-33; Int. Br. 15-19), that the UCC is inapplicable (Pal. Br. 4647; Int. Br. 13-15), and that strict liability theory is
unavailable to Thiokol (Pal. Br. 44-46; Int. Br. 17-18).

These

submissions are flatly contrary to controlling law.
A.

Palmer and Interwest Are Liable in Tort

The trial court, based upon arguments presented by Palmer,
held tort law inapplicable here.

App. A at 6-7.

Palmer relied

upon East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858 (1986), to support this position before the trial court.
In tacit recognition that its East River arguments are unfounded
(see Thiokol Br. 4 5-4 6), Palmer now avoids any reference to that
case and retreats, instead, to Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

Accord Kostelac v. United States, 247 F.2d 723, 729-30
(9th Cir. 1957) (attempted contractual "cure" does not result in
"waiver" of right to rescind because "the law ought to encourage
the parties to reach amicable settlements of [contractual]
disputes"); Chaplin v. Bessire & Co., 361 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ky.
1962) (same); Thiokol Br. 41-42; see also Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (Utah 1936) (cited in Int. Br. 10) (an
insurer's request that its agents comply with orders is not a
"waiver"; the request does not "indicate a waiver or
relinquishment" of the insurer's contractual rights).
15

701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Beck, however, accords Palmer no surer

legal footing than East River.
In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that "if parties
arrange rights, duties and obligations under a contract, their
cause of action for breach of those obligations is in contract and
not in tort."

Pal. Br. 29.

refused to recognize —

Rather, the Supreme Court merely

in the context of the first-party

relationship between an insurer and its insured —
faith refusal to settle.

701 P.2d at 798.23

limited conclusion in Beck —

the tort of bad-

The Supreme Court's

i.e., that bad faith claims between

an insurer and its insured are covered by the duty of good faith
and fair dealing (701 P.2d at 799-80) —

quite clearly does not

establish, as a general matter, that a contract precludes all tort
claims between contracting parties.
Indeed, in Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d
650 (Utah 1990), also cited by Palmer (at 30-31), the Supreme Court
clarified that Beck does not "preclude the bringing of a tort claim
independently of a contract claim."

795 P.2d at 654.

In Culp, the

court held that a claim for negligent misrepresentation (arising
out of the issuance of a contract of title insurance) could be
brought concurrently with a contract claim because "'the acts
constituting a breach of contract may also result in breaches of
duty that are independent of the contract and may give rise to

Specifically, the court concluded that "the good faith
duty to bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all
contracts and . . . a violation of that duty gives rise to a
claim for breach of contract." 701 P.2d at 798.
16

causes of action in tort.111

795 P.2d at 654 (quoting Beck, 701

P.2d at 800 n.3).
The Utah Supreme Court, moreover, has unequivocally held that
11

[a] party who breaches his duty of due care toward another may be

found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship
giving rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the
parties."
24

1983) .

DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah
.

.

.

.

.

.

Accordingly, in line with the "majority of

jurisdictions," the Utah Supreme Court "recognized a duty to
exercise reasonable care on the part of one who undertakes to
render services."

663 P.2d at 436.

The tort-based duty to exercise reasonable care unambiguously
extends to contractors in the position of Palmer and Interwest.
They were under a duty to perform "in accordance with the plans
specifications, and directions given [them] by [Thiokol] with a
reasonable degree of skill," or "that degree of skill and care
ordinarily possessed and exercised by other contractors doing the
same or similar work in this locality."

Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d

1117, 1121 (Utah 1975) (citing Marin Mun. Water Dist. v. Peninsula
Paving Co., 94 P.2d 404, 406 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939)).

As a

result, they are liable for all damages flowing from their breach

The DCR court emphasized that the fact a party is
"•acting . . . under a contract'" does not relieve that party
from tort liability because "'the two duties are distinct.1" Id.
at 436 (quoting Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 79 N.E. 503,
505-06 (Ind. 1906)).
17

of that duty.

The trial court's refusal to consider Thiokol's

tort claims constitutes error and requires reversal.
Palmer's and Interwest's tort liability, finally, is not
solely derivative, as Interwest claims.

Int. Br. 15. As noted in

Thiokol's Brief (at 48 n.41), neither Palmer (Tr. 1473, 1791-92)
nor Interwest (Tr. 1258-59) investigated the tank manufacturer's
experience —
27

so.

despite their express contractual obligation to do
.

.

.

Such an investigation would have revealed the manufacturer's

In
a contractor
in injury to
for the tort

Marin, 94 P.2d at 406, the court held that "[w]here
departs" from contract specifications "which results
adjacent property, then he is responsible in damages
he has committed."

26

Palmer's citation of Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley
Dairy Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), to support its claimed
exemption from tort liability (Pal. Br. 33-34) is inapposite and,
in a very real sense, ironic. That case, unlike the present
situation, did not involve a contractor's tort liability for
injuries to person or property flowing from the contractor's
failure to conform to contract specifications. Rather, Paul
Mueller merely involved a contractor's possible liability for
"economic loss"; i.e.. "loss attributable to nondangerous defects
in the product." 657 P.2d at 1286. Thus, the case simply has no
bearing where (as here) a contractor's shoddy performance results
in danger to person or property. Cf. DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.,
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) (post-Paul Mueller case imposing "a duty
to exercise reasonable care" in the rendering of services).
Moreover, the Paul Mueller court concluded that an owner who had
contracted to purchase the defective product did not need to
invoke tort theory because the owner's contractor — who had
actually procured the defective product — "bore responsibility
for correction of such defects." 657 P.2d at 1286. The
reasoning of Paul Mueller, in short, would not absolve Palmer,
but instead would impose upon Palmer — who contracted with
Rysgaard to provide the defective tanks — the "responsibility
for correction of [the tanks'] defects." Id.
27

The contract required the manufacturer to be a company
"whose products have been used satisfactorily in similar services
for at least 2 years prior to the issue date of the Contract."
App. H f 1.0.3.A.
18

unsuitability.

Because Palmer's and Interwest's "failure to

exercise reasonable care" in the selection of the tank manufacturer
clearly "increase[d] the risk of [physical] harm" to Thiokol, they
are liable in tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (adopted
in DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d at 436).
B.

UCC Implied Warranties Are Applicable to This Case

Palmer and Interwest assert that the UCC is not applicable
because the contract was not for the sale of "goods" (Pal. Br. 47,
Int. Br. 13-14) and they are not "merchants" (Pal. Br. 46, Int. Br.
13-14).

The contrary is true.

Palmer asserts that the contract was not for the sale of
"goods" because the installed tanks are not personal property.
Pal. Br. 47. This argument simply ignores the statutory definition
of "goods." Thiokol Br. 36 (the tanks are "goods" because they
were "movable" at the time they were "identified" to the contract;
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-105(1), 70A-2-501(l)(b)).
Interwest, recognizing the frailty of the above argument,
submits that —

even if the tanks are "goods" —

primarily for the purchase of "services."

Thiokol contracted

Int. Br. 13-14 (citing

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir.
1971).

However, even if Thiokol's contracts are viewed as

involving both "services" and "goods," the UCC controls. The test
for classifying such contracts is whether the contract's
predominant factor "is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or
28

The manufacturer selected by Palmer and Interwest had
built no tanks since 1970. Tr. 1967.
19

is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved
installation of a water heater in a bathroom)."

(e.g..

Bonebrake v. Cox,

499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted); accord
Aluminum Co. of Am.f 451 F.2d at 1115 (applying Utah law).
The predominant purpose of Thiokol's contracts with Palmer and
Interwest was the acquisition of a waste water treatment plant,
with the required labor only incidentally involved.

Accord Omaha

Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. Supp.
1069, 1085 (D. Neb. 1976) (dispute involving the design,
construction and installation of a sewage treatment plant is best
resolved "by treating it as a sale of goods under the [UCC].

It is

clear that courts are turning to the Uniform Commercial Code to
resolve the problems of transactions of this type.") (citations
omitted); St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 729, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (contract for construction of
air pollution control device was "to allow plaintiff to acquire a
pollution control system and any services were incidental to that
primary purpose").
Palmer and Interwest, moreover, are "merchants."

Palmer's

assertion that it "has never held itself out as a fiberglass tank
manufacturer" (Pal. Br. 46) is beside the point.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 70A-2-104(l) provides that one becomes a merchant, not only by
"hold[ing] himself out as having knowledge or skill," but also by
employing an "intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill." As the leading hornbook on the
Uniform Commercial Code explains:
The first phrase captures the jeweler, the hardware store
20

owner, the haberdasher, and others selling from
inventory. The second description, having to do with
occupation, knowledge, and skill, includes electricians,
plumbers, carpenters, boat builders, and the like. . . .
[A] "bank" or "even universities" through their agents
can have the necessary knowledge or skill to make them
merchants.
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9.6, at 345 (2d ed.
1984) (emphasis added) (citing Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams,
Inc., 520 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1974) (mechanical contracting firm held
"merchant" with respect to cooling equipment it installed)).
Accordingly, the "merchant" status of the tank manufacturer is
imputed to Palmer and Interwest and the UCC implied warranties
apply.
C.

Palmer and Interwest Are Strictly Liable for Their
Defective Performances

The appellees, finally, assert that they are not liable under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Palmer asserts

that strict liability does not apply to transactions involving
"sophisticated" parties (Pal. Br. 44-46), while Interwest asserts
that strict liability does not apply to construction contracts.
Int. Br. 17-18.

Neither claim is meritorious.

Palmer's "sophisticated party" exception to strict liability
is based on the much-criticized decision in Scandinavian Airlines
System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).

In

Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984), the Arizona
See also Schneider v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah
1958) (implying warranties of merchantability and fitness for
intended purpose even without the UCC; "the supplier is deemed to
warrant the product to be reasonably safe and suitable for the
use for which it is intended").
21

Supreme Court noted that, while "the need for risk distribution and
compensation" is less compelling when "sophisticated" parties are
involved (694 P.2d at 211; cf. Pal. Br. 45-46 (making identical
argument)), that is an insufficient ground for limiting strict
liability to "fordinary consumers.1"

694 P.2d at 211 (citing

Scandinavian Airlines).
[T]he doctrine of strict liability has additional
objectives [beyond risk distribution and compensation].
Foremost among these is the promotion of safety. The
doctrine of strict tort liability provides manufacturers
a strong incentive to design, manufacture and distribute
safe products . . . . That goal of tort law is best
served when those who distribute products are held
strictly liable for damage resulting from products which
contain unreasonably dangerous defects, which cause
"accidents" endangering life or property, and which
actually damage persons or property.
* * * *

Other factors militate in favor of a uniform rule which
applies to all consumers. Immunity, including the
limited immunity from claims by certain classes of
claimants, does not promote adherence to the standards of
care imposed by the law. . . . We do not limit the
availability of § 402A recovery to "ordinary consumers"
but recognize its viability for all who can meet its
proof requirements. This court does not favor
distinctions based upon the class or size of the parties
before it. The applicability of a tort theory depends
not upon the size of the plaintiff, but upon the nature
of the claim. The very attempt to distinguish tort
rights on the basis of economic strength would raise
collateral issues which we deem irrelevant. An actor has
no more privilege to inflict injury on the wealthy than
on the poor. The same rules apply to all, plaintiff or
defendant, large or small.
Salt River Project, 694 P.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted); accord
Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair, Ltd., 428 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399
(Sup. Ct. 1980).
Interwest's assertion that strict liability does not apply to
construction projects is no more persuasive.
22

Even assuming, as

Interwest argues (Int. Br. 17-18), that contractors should not be
held strictly liable for the erection of an "unreasonably
dangerous" building, that is not the basis for Thiokol1s claim.
Thiokol is simply asserting that Palmer and Interwest are liable
for their provision of dangerously defective goods —
"under-designed" tanks.

App. A at 6.

i.e., the

And, whatever the vagaries

of strict liability theory as applied to "general contractors of
large commercial buildings" (Pal. Br. 18), it is absolutely clear
that the suppliers of dangerously defective products used in a
construction project are strictly liable.

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.

Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (supplier of defective
steel beam used in construction of mall strictly liable for damages
flowing from mall's collapse).
Thiokolfs tort, UCC and strict liability theories are wellgrounded in law and were improperly disregarded by the trial court.
This Court, therefore, must reverse and remand Thiokol's
alternative theories for trial.
IV.

PALMER AND INTERWEST HAVE DISTORTED THE RECORD TO DEFLECT
THE COURT FROM THE LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THIS CASE

Because established law does not support the trial court's
decision, appellees strenuously submit that Thiokol has disregarded
the court's factual findings (Pal. Br. 8 ) , failed to "marshall" the
evidence" (Pal. Br. 20-23; Int. Br. 6 ) , and not recited the
evidence in the light "most favorable" to them.

Pal. Br. 23.

These issues do not loom large because, however one construes the
record, the trial court's unprecedented use of comparative fault
(see supra Part I ) , its disregard of the law of "waiver" and
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"modification" (see supra Part II) and its refusal to decide wellfounded tort theories (see supra Part III) require reversal.
Appellees' "factual" assertions, in any event, are devoid of merit.
Thiokol has not "disregarded" the Findings of Fact (Pal. Br.
8), it has simply given them the same weight the trial court did.
The memorandum decision was written by the court; the Findings of
Fact by Palmer.

Accordingly, the trial court itself discounted

their importance.

In post-trial arguments regarding the accuracy

of the "findings," the lower court stated that "[w]hen you folks
are arguing before the Court of Appeals on this thing you've [sic,
you're] going to have the memorandum decision analyzed, torn apart,
dissected.

It's a bigger part of your arguments than the formal

findings are." Tr. 2481-82. Thiokol, therefore, has merely relied
on findings actually made by the trial court (i.e., the memorandum
decision, App. A) rather than Palmer's post-hoc characterizations.
That reliance upon the trial court's memorandum rather than
Palmer's "findings" is appropriate becomes clear when the merits of
Palmer's "marshalling" and "favorable light" arguments are
examined.

Contrary to Palmer's assertion (at 8), Thiokol's opening

brief fairly and succinctly summarizes all of the arguments made by
Palmer and Interwest, as well as all of the evidence in support of
those arguments.

Compare Pal. Br. 8-19 with Thiokol Br. 2-13, 13-

19; State v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565, 566 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Indeed, the only "additions" supplied by Palmer are outright
distortions and patent mischaracterizations.
Because correction of the appellees' factual misstatements
requires the citation of fairly lengthy excerpts from the
24

transcript, and because these factual matters are not (in any
event) determinative of this case, Thiokol's response is set out in
the Addendum to this Reply Brief.

Thiokol hesitates to correct the

"facts"; even Thiokol's limited response in the Addendum lends
credence to the appellees' claim that this is a "clearly erroneous"
case.

E.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

It is not.

See supra Parts I,

II & III. Many of the "factual" assertions in Palmer's brief,
however, are too outrageous to pass without comment —

as a brief

perusal of the Addendum will demonstrate.
Moreover, the Addendum —

at the very least —

deflates

Palmer's claim that the recitation of the evidence in Thiokol's
brief does not adequately "favor" appellees. Pal. Br. 23. Palmer
is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the record.

It is

not entitled to distort the record in any manner it sees fit.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the
case remanded for determination of Thiokol's damages incurred as a
result of Interwest's, Palmer's and Rysgaard's breach of contract,
breach of express and implied warranties, negligence and provision
of unreasonably dangerous tanks.
Respectfjjj^ly submitted,

Mary Anne d. Wood
Richard G/Wilkins
Anthony B.^Quinn
WOOD, SPENDLOVE & QUINN
Counsel For Appellant
Thiokol Corporation
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Addenda

ADDENDUM
The briefs filed by Palmer and Interwest submit as "facts"
numerous items that are either not supported —
contradicted by —

the record.

or directly

In each numbered paragraph below,

Thiokol sets out a "factual" assertion made by appellees.

Thiokol

then reproduces the actual testimony from the transcript revealing
the appellees' mischaracterization.

To avoid the charge that it is

merely "rearguing" its case (cf. Pal. Br. 22-23), Thiokol (to the
maximum extent possible) will allow the transcript to speak for
itself.

However, because of the technical nature of the issues

involved, some textual explanation is necessary to make the
transcript comprehensible.
1.

Pal. Br. 4: "Expert witnesses testified that had the
tanks been used as contemplated by the plans and
specifications, the tanks as manufactured would have been
serviceable (Tr 2132-33)."

The foregoing is an outright misrepresentation of the cited
testimony.

At the cited pages of the transcript, Paul Tullis (a

research scientist with Utah State University, Tr. 2101), testified
—

not that tank T33 had been improperly "used" —

but that the

tank was not built to even a safety factor of three (let alone the
safety factor of ten required by NBS PS15-69 and industry
standards).

According to Tullis, completely overfilling the tanks

would increase the water level by 7 inches, which in turn would
increase pressure in the tanks by 3.36%.

As a result, completely

overfilling the tanks would only take 1/100th of the safety factor
for a tank designed to a safety factor of three and the tank (even
if it had been only one-third as strong as specified by NBS PS15-
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69) would not have failed.
Tr. 2132-33 (cross examination):
Q.

Let me ask this: assuming that all the tests done on
the side walls of these tanks indicate that the
tanks were probably strong enough to withstand three
times the hoop stresses at the bottom of the tank,
three times ultimate, can you account for in any
fashion any additional pressures or additional
stresses or additional something on this tank which
would overcome that three times the ultimate hoop
stress which has been measured?

A.

No. I couldn't find any way of getting anything more
than about seven inches [of overfilling], which is
one point — well, three percent.

Q.

3.3 6 percent?

A.

A safety factor of three means 300 percent. We're
taking three percent [because of the overfilling] so
we're taking 100th of the safety factor.

Q.

And that 3.3 percent you've calculated into, say,
any rise, if there were one, for three inches in an
open area in the center of the lid?

A.

Well, the three percent is seven inches of rise [in
water level].

Q.

Seven inches of rise?

A.

Spilling out of the manway.

On the very next page, Tullis (still under cross examination)
gave his frank opinion as to why tank T33 failed.

According to

Tullis, the tank failed because it was weak.
Tr. 2134 (cross examination) (emphasis added):
Q.

So assuming that there is three times — assuming
the strength of the side wall is three times that of
the hoop stresses at the bottom of the tank, even if
completely full you can't account for or understand
how this tank failed, can you?

A.

I wasn't asked to address why it failed. I was only
asked to address were there any hydraulic forces
fi.e., overfilling] sufficient to cause failure, and
my answer would be no.
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Q.

From a hydraulic standpoint you canft see what
additional forces would have caused it to fail
because you can only account for 3.36 percent
additional forces?

A.

Right. My calculation — my conclusion would be
that it did not fail because of excessive force
fi.e., overfilling], it failed because of weakness
of the tank. It could not take the normal force
that was on the tank.

The testimony cited in Palmer's brief, in short, does not
establish that the tanks would have been "serviceable" if "used as
contemplated by the plans and specifications" (Pal. Br. 4), but
rather that the tanks would have been serviceable if they had been
built as contemplated by the plans and specifications.
however, were not so built.

The tanks,

Indeed, Palmer's own expert witnesses

agreed that (contrary to Palmer's current position, Pal. Br. 40-42)
the original plans and specifications for the tanks were not
unusual and —

if followed — would have resulted in perfectly safe

tanks.
Tr. 1646-47 (George Fisher, Palmer's fiberglass expert) (cross
examination):
Q.

Now, the specifications, and I think its been
referred to as Exhibit 183, for the tanks, they
aren't unusual in the industry, wouldn't you say
that's true.

A.

That's correct.

Q.

You've seen specifications like that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've produced perfectly adequate, serviceable
product as a result of those kinds of specifications?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

In fact, you bid on this project, didn't you?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

And you weren't the successful bidder, but you bid on
these very specifications?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you seek any clarifications?

A.

No.

Q.

You understood what was contemplated by these
specifications, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you would have produced tanks that didn't fail after
two months if you had been the one selected?

Mr. Daubney:

Objection.

Calls for a conclusion, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I'm going to allow it, though.
a position to so testify.

THE WITNESS:

Absolutely.

I think he's in

See also Tr. 1898 (testimony of Brent Thomas, Palmerfs expert
witness) (witness responds "That's correct" to the question whether
he could have used Thiokol's original plans and specifications to
design and build "perfectly serviceable tanks").
2.

Pal. Br. 13: "Dr. Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulic's
expert, testified that if the side-walls of the
tanks were three times as strong as the
expected hoop stress of 3.000 psi, he could not
account for the failure (Tr 2132-33). The
side-walls were that strong."

The above characterization of the transcript is simply wrong.
The testimony from Tr. 2132-33 is set out under paragraph no. 1,
above.

As a review of that testimony indicates, Dr. Tullis did not

testify that he "could not account for the failure."
Rather, Dr. Tullis testified that —

Pal. Br. 13.

if, as Palmer asserts (Pal.

Br. 13), the side-walls of the tanks had at least a safety factor
of three —

then completely overfilling the tank would not have
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resulted in its rupture.
f 1, above).

See Testimony from Tr. 2132-33 (under

Thus, rather than showing that Tullis "could not

account for the failure" (Pal. Br. 13), the testimony on pages
2132-33 supports Tullis' ultimate conclusion that the tank "did not
fail because of excessive force, it failed because of weakness of
the tank."
3.

Tr. 2134.

Pal. Br. 19: "Dr. Glasso Tsic] stated that the failure
was not inconsistent with upward pressure (Tr 357-58)."

The trial court found that tank T33 failed as a result of
overfilling, which put upward pressure on the tank causing it to
burst.

App. A at 5.

As set out in Thiokol's Brief (at 18-19),

this "upward pressure" theory was not supported by any evidence,
expert or otherwise, except for self-serving statements by the tank
manufacturer, John Rysgaard.

E.g.f Tr. 1948-51. Palmer,

therefore, is understandably hard-pressed to come up with something
(anything?) to support the trial court's "failure by overfilling"
conclusion.

But, Palmer's bald-faced assertion that Dr. Galasso

did not find the failure "inconsistent" with uplift (Pal. Br. 19)
is astounding, because a straightforward reading of the transcript
reveals that Dr. Galasso testified precisely to the contrary.
Dr. Galasso testified that "[i]f something fails by uplift
alone, then my experience is that the failure would be
circumferential," rather than the vertical rupture experienced by
T33.

Tr. 357. And, when asked whether the failure of T33 was

"inconsistent with that type of ri.e., an uplift] failure," Dr.
Galasso succinctly replied, "[y]eah, it was, because in that kind
of a failure ri.e., an uplift failure] there was no vertical
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rupture."

Tr. 358.

The transcript excerpt follows.

Tr. 357-58 (emphasis added):
Q.

. . . This failure that you've described, are there — is
this inconsistent with a failure resulting from upward
pressure on the tanks?

A.

Not usually, no.

Q.

Explain what you mean.

A.

Upward pressure on the tank — well, the main stress in
this tank was hoop stress. The largest stress was stress
in the tangential direction, hoop stress. In something
that had some — in something that had a large — well,
uplift, uplift is reflected as an axial stress, not a
hoop stress. If something fails by uplift alone, then my
experience is that the failure would be circumferential.
As a matter of fact, that's driven home because the first
field tank I ever fixed was a field repair of a 30-foot
tank in Bellingham, Washington that ruptured due to over
pressure uplift and was not well held down. The tank
bottom ruptured and it ruptured around almost 270
degrees. That tank was filled with acid and it ate the
corporate — ate the carport off a corporate headquarters
of a major pulp mill and was quite a hot potato for about
a year. I came to work there and my new boss said I have
this little project for you.

Q.

Was this failure inconsistent with that type of failure
fi.e.. uplift failure]?

A.

Yeah, it was, because in that kind of a failure there was
no vertical rupture. There was a circumferential
failure.

See also Tr. 3 60-62 (Galasso summarizes numerous reasons why "this
rupture was inconsistent with a rupture based upon an uplift
pressure").
4.

Pal. Br. 12: "Glasso fsic] admitted that the
specifications don't state a safety factor (Tr 417),
nor strength requirements for woven roving (Tr
418)."

Dr. Galasso did not give the above testimony.

On the

contrary, he testified that Thiokol's specifications required
adherence to NBS PS15-69, and merely stated that he could not
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remember whether NBS PS15-69 required a particular strength of
woven roving.

Tr. 417-18.

And, somewhat later in his testimony,

Dr. Galasso stressed that NBS PS15-69 establishes a safety factor
of ten.

Tr. 438, 446-47.

The transcript excerpts follow.

Tr. 417-18 (cross examination) (emphasis added):
Q.

And you've seen the plans and specifications that Thiokol
prepared for submission on these tanks, have you not?

A.

Uh-huh, as part of a much larger project.

Q.

What does it say in there about the safety factor?

A.

That I can remember it doesn't say anything about the
safety factor. It specifies or gives a specification
which itself is an industry standard, or implies an
industry standard safety factor.

Q.

The specification you're talking about is the PS 15-69?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is there anything in the specifications that says the
wall thickness?

A.

I can't remember in this specification whether there is.
15-69 gives a minimum wall thickness of one-eighth.

Q.

I'm talking, sir, about specific specifications.

A.

I can't remember if this specification states a minimum
thickness.

Q.

Is there anything about the type or width or strength of
the woven roving?

A.

Not specifically mentioned in — not that I remember that
is specifically mentioned in the specifications.

Tr. 438 (cross examination) (emphasis added):
Q.

. . . If we want a safety factor of ten then we say in
the specifications we want a safety factor of ten, isn't
that true?

A.

Well, no. Another way to put it is to say I want to
abide by a specification which has an applicable part
saying that I want a safety factor of ten.
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Tr. 446-47 (cross examination) (emphasis added):
Q.

. . . Where does it say in this entire document [i.e.,
NBS PS15-69], sir, that you have to have a safety factor
of ten?

A.

It's implied by the footnote.

Q.

Don't tell me what's implied, tell me where it says it.

A.

If it doesn't say it it does give me guidance and the
only thing I can do as a prudent designer is to go by the
guidance given me in the specification, no matter where I
see it. In this case I see it in the footnote.

Q.

When it says based on a safety factor of ten to one,
doesn't that imply that other safety factors might be
used?

A.

No, it does not.

Q.

But does this say that this is a minimum safety factor or
a mandatory one?

A.

No. It just says — this says it is based — the design
intent is a safety factor of ten. If I choose to
overdesign it, fine, I'm sure nobody would worry about
that. If I choose to underdesign it, I think I'm
conflicting with the intent of the specification.

5.

Pal. Br. 5: "Sometime after June 18, 1989, Thiokol . . .
modified the tanks from gravity fill, as designed and
specified, to pressure fill (Tr. 147, 2083, 1285, 1304)."
Int. Br. 3: "The tanks were changed from a gravity
fill to a pressure fill system . . . [citing same
transcript pages noted by Palmer].

There is absolutely no evidence that Thiokol's addition of
pumps resulted in "pressure fill."

The "pressure fill" contention

was the centerpiece of Palmer's "attenuation" argument.
Thiokol Br. 17-18 & n.ll.
—

See

Palmer's experts, however, admitted that

if the pipe filling the tank had "open channel flow" (i.e., air

space inside the pipe) —

"attenuation" would not occur and could

have no impact on the tank.

Tr. 1369-72, 1393, 1431, 1436.

Palmer's experts also conceded that "open channel flow" results in
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"gravity flow."

Tr. 1372. The evidence was undisputed that the

pipes filling the tanks would always have "open channel flow" (Tr.
2116-17), resulting in "gravity flow" —

not "pressure" —

filling

of the tanks. Tr. 2119, 2123.
Indeed, the evidence on this issue was so clear that the trial
court rejected Palmer's contention that Thiokol had modified the
tanks to "pressure fill."

The court concluded (App. A at 5)

(emphasis added):
Much also has been said relative to the change in the
method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead
feed. Though that is a substantial change which in and
of itself may void any warranties given, the Court is not
persuaded that that change without more resulted in the
failure. The evidence of vibration or trauma to the
tanks from the overhead filling was, to this Court,
insufficiently persuasive to indicate that it was a
causative factor.
6.

Pal. Br. 13: "Dr. Glasso [sic, Galasso],
Thiokol's main expert, admitted he could not
determine what caused the failure (Tr
448). . . . He was, at most 'suspicious1 that
the lack of sufficient overlap may have caused
the problem, but could not state any cause with
reasonable probability (Tr 356)."

The above is an intentionally misleading summary of the
testimony given by Dr. Maurice Galasso, an independent consulting
engineer specializing in commercial fiberglass design.

Tr. 319.

Review of the transcript at pages 356 and 448-49 reveals that Dr.
Galasso was, indeed, "suspicious" that the tank failed at an
overlap of the woving roving because the rupture exposed straight,
uncut edges of the fabric.

But, far from being unable to

"determine what caused the failure" (Pal. Br. 13), Galasso —
response to questions from the trial court —

in

gave his best

professional opinion that the failure was caused by insufficient
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overlapping of the woven roving.

Dr. Galasso's actual testimony,

from pages 355-56 and 448-49 of the transcript, follows.
Tr. 355-56 (emphasis added):
Q.

You talked about the weakness at an overlap. Are there
any indications from the photographs that indeed this
failure did occur where the woven roving did not have
sufficient overlap?

A.

Yes, I think so.

Q.

Can you identify those points in the photographs?

A.

Okay.

MR. KELLY:

This is Exhibit 323 the witness is referring
to. [Exh. 323 is included in Appendix K to
Thiokol's Brief.]

THE WITNESS:
Okay. This is fairly high up on the tank wall,
but I believe — I can't see what goes on in here, but I
can see here and what basically you see here, whenever I
see anything like that, a very sharp edge with very
little taper to it, the first thing I will look for is
very little overlap, because typically you don't get — a
failure does not look that sharp. That's almost — its
very suspicious that the failure occurred in the resin in
something like that.
Most failures show, you know, a failure path which is not
— does not have the ends of the roving showing like
that. It may pull out all right, but you have different
length rovings. That can be shown, though we don't have
one here, but if you look on test samples you'll see that
behavior. These things basically usually do not break
right across the sample. They break rather irregularly.
The only time they really want to break right across the
sample is if they have a preferred path of breaking, but
that sort of thing makes me very suspicious, although I
can't look at that. If I could look at that and put that
back together I could give you a better opinion, but any
time I see something like that I'm very suspicious that
there was — I'm very suspicious about the overlap.
That's the first thing I will look at.
Tr. 448-49 (emphasis added):
THE COURT:

You told us . . . how this thing broke or
failed?

THE WITNESS:

My idea of it, yeah.
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THE COURT:

But you haven't been able to specify exactly
why it broke, have you?

THE WITNESS:

No.

THE COURT:

You simply don't know?

THE WITNESS:

It is my best opinion based on what I can see
and what information has been given to me.

THE COURT:

In other words, it is your opinion that
somewhere on that tank there was a place where
the tensile strength was not above the pounds
per square inch applied, correct?

THE WITNESS:

Someplace that would not sustain that stress
and it ruptured, it locally ruptured.

7.

Pal. Br. 6-7: "The operation of the pumps
created an uplifting force of approximately
17,000 pounds (Tr. 2136-38, 604-05),"
Pal. Br. 19: "Dr. Paul Tullis, Thiokol's
hydraulic expert, testified that overfilling
the tanks would cause an uplifting force
between 7,000 and 28,000 pounds (Tr. 2136,
2138)."

Palmer makes the above assertions to support its claim that
the tanks were "neither designed nor built" to sustain the claimed
uplift force.

Pal. Br. 7. The cited transcript pages, however,

provide no support for the asserted "28,000 pounds" of pressure.
The transcript, instead, reveals that (at most) overfilling the
tanks would produce between 6,000 and 16,000 pounds of uplift. Tr.
2136 (6,000 to 7,000 pounds); Tr. 2137 (15,000 to 16,000 pounds);
Tr. 605 (11,000 pounds).
That uplift, moreover, would only "increase[] the stress [on
the tank] three percent" (Tr. 2138) —

an increase well within the

design parameters of the tanks, even assuming they had a safety
factor of three rather than ten. Tr. 605 (noting that the uplift
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created by completely overfilling the tank "would not be enough to
cause any significant increase in the stress on the tank walls to
be of any concern").

See also Tr. 3233 (a 3% increase in stress on

the tanks would take "100th of the safety factor" of three).
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